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 During the period between the writing of my Microsoft Antitrust article in this 
issue and the writing of this rejoinder, the most significant developments in the case were 
the filing of the appeal of Microsoft, the filing of the government’s objections, and the 
open hearing of the case by the Washington DC court of appeals sitting en banc in late 
February 2001.  The questioning of both sides by the judges of the court of appeals was 
very frank and pointed.  Most of the criticism of the appeals judges  (as seen by their 
questions and by the heated dialog with the lawyers of both sides) was aimed towards the 
plaintiffs.  On a number of occasions, the appeals court judges questioned the validity of 
the district court’s  “findings of fact,” calling them conclusions not based on fact.1  The 
appeals court also seemed to question the strength of the plaintiffs’ case (i) on the tying 
allegation, as well as (ii) on attempting to monopolize the browser market allegation.   
 
The appeals court was critical of the procedure that Judge Jackson used in the 
remedies part of the case,2 as well as of the necessity and effectiveness of the ordered 
                                                 
1  For example, at the February 27, 2001 morning hearing of the appeals court, judges questioned 
Jeffrey P. Minear, representing the United States, as follows: 
“THE COURT:  The District Court, like I said, there are some findings that are merely just 
conclusions and I find no basis for them.  So I’m not in that camp that says because the 
District Court lists something under findings of fact it’s gospel.  There has to be a fact in fact.  
THE COURT:  It has to be supported.  
THE COURT:  And it has to be supported by something other than the mere statement of the 
District Court.”  
In a second example from the same hearing, a judge asks Mr. Minear: 
“THE COURT:  Let me ask you again so that you can help me.  This is one of the cases, one 
of the places for me, where the failure of the findings of fact to point to any record, citations, 
makes it very, very difficult on appellate review because they are very conclusionary 
statements here that I tried to trace to determine whether there was any real data to support the 
observation that there was a market for browserless operating systems.  It is certainly not 
intuitive given that all of the operating systems offer browsers that can be removed or deleted.  
But in making your argument that in all the other cases they can be removed and 
therefore Microsoft is forcing, you’re ignoring Microsoft’s counter-argument which is they 
don’t integrate as deeply.  
 But in any event, make that your second answer.  Tell me if there is any data to back up 
… I quite frankly ... I hear my colleagues in the first part of this argument that we’re supposed 
to defer to factual findings.  But when I find factual findings that look very conclusionary and 
there is no citation to anything, I don’t think my obligation as an appellate court is to defer to 
them.  So what is the data?” 
 
2  For example, at the February 27, 2001 morning hearing of the appeals court, a judge asked David 
C. Frederick, representing the United States: 
“THE COURT:  Let me ask you a couple of questions about the standard applied by the 
District Court.  The District Court said that the plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason 
alone have some entitlement to a remedy of their choice.  The District Court also said these 
officials are by reason of office obliged and expected to consider and to act in the public 
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remedy (breakup).3 The appeals court also seemed to be very critical of Judge Jackson’s 
extended interviews with journalists and strongly suggested that if the case is remanded 
to a lower court (for either a new determination of facts, or for determination of remedies, 
or both) that it should not go to Judge Jackson.4  Overall, the court of appeals appeared 
unlikely to affirm all three parts of the liability decision of the lower court and also 
unlikely to affirm the breakup remedy. 
 
Professors Frank Fisher, Daniel O’Brien, and Francis O’Toole wrote 
commentaries on my Microsoft Antitrust article in this issue, and I am grateful for their 
remarks.  My comments below are mostly on issues where I either disagree or I feel that 
there is a need for further research.  The authors also discuss a number of issues that were 
not discussed in my original paper.  Because of shortage of space, I will not discuss all 
the issues raised, although I would have liked to.   
 
 
2. Issues Raised by Professor Fisher 
 
In his comment, Prof. Fisher has written very extensive comments on the 
Microsoft case that are not limited to my original paper.  In a number of cases, Prof. 
Fisher and I disagree on the facts.  Prof. Fisher puts considerable faith in the “findings of 
fact” of the District Court.  However, judges of the Washington DC Court of Appeals in a 
recent (February 2001) open court cross examination of DOJ’s (and Microsoft’s and 
States’) lawyers stated that they believed that some of the conclusions in Judge Jackson’s 
“findings of fact” were not based on facts, and signaled the intend of the Court of 
Appeals to re-examine the lower court’s “findings of fact.”  In any case, my disagreement 
with Prof. Fisher on facts cannot easily be resolved in this setup, so I will concentrate on 
the economic arguments. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
interest.  Microsoft is not.  Are those appropriate standards for a District Judge to consider in 
framing a remedy?” 
 
3  For example, at the February 27, 2001 morning hearing of the appeals court, a judge pointed to 
David C. Frederick, representing the United States: 
“THE COURT:  Stranger still, even after the remedy, Microsoft retains the monopoly.  You 
cited Grinnell, and I think there’s a point in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Grinnell that says 
the first order of business when there’s been a Section 2 violation is to issue a remedy that 
will destroy the monopoly power.  This remedy doesn’t do that.”   
In another question in the same hearing, a judge notes the potential problems that a breakup might 
create and the fact that there was no hearing to discuss them:  
“THE COURT:  No, no, no.  The question that’s being raised is whether a company that has 
not grown through combinations can be perforated along the lines proposed by the 
government without a hearing into the problems that might create.” 
 
4  For example, at the February 27, 2001 afternoon hearing of the appeals court, a judge asked John 
G. Roberts, representing the States plaintiffs:  
“THE COURT:  Well, I’m not sure that I see how you can with a straight face ask us if we 
remand, to send it to the same judge after these comments.” 
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First, let me point out the point where I agree with Prof. Fisher.  I concur that high 
technology industries are not above or outside the reach of antitrust law.  It is perfectly 
valid for actions by high technology companies to be scrutinized by antitrust authorities.  
It may also be difficult in these fast-moving industries to pin down the right market 
definition. 
 
There is a major point on which I disagree with Prof. Fisher.  In his commentary, 
he augments his definition/rule of an anti-competitive act as one that “involves a 
deliberate sacrifice of profits in order to gain or protect monopoly rents as opposed to 
gaining of rents through superior skill, foresight, and industry.”  I believe that I do not 
misstate in my main paper the earlier Fisher definition of anti-competitive acts.  There I 
used the definition that Prof. Fisher had used in pre-filed testimony and in his live 
testimony at the trial.  The new definition of an anti-competitive act (in his commentary 
to my paper) has the additional part “as opposed to the gaining of rents through superior 
skill, foresight, and industry.”   
 
I have already discussed in the main paper the faults of the earlier rule.  But I 
believe that the new Fisher rule also has faults.  First, it is too vague and hard to 
implement.  To implement this rule, the antitrust authority, a judge, or a jury need to 
know what monopoly profits would have existed if the act that may be characterized as 
anti-competitive were not taken, and the extent that this particular act has affected 
monopoly profits.  This is a task of enormous difficulty and uncertainty.  The judge will 
have to be able to calculate the profits that would have been realized in a hypothetical 
situation in which the particular act (that may be possibly characterized as anti-
competitive) were not taken, compare them with the present situation where the act was 
taken, and conclude that profits were lost as a consequence of taking the particular act.  
This requires a calculation of the firm’s profits in the long run when the act is taken and 
profits in the long run when the action is not taken.  And, a proper comparison would 
require a calculation of the firm’s profits in the long run when, having not taken the act 
that may be characterized as anti-competitive, the firm implemented instead other 
strategies.  That is, if one makes long run maximum profits comparisons, and truly wants 
to implement Fisher’s rule, one needs to calculate the maximized profits in the absence of 
the act that may be characterized as anti-competitive.  This requires calculating profits 
where the firm has implemented other strategies not used at present because, for example, 
they were substitutes to the act that may be characterized as anti-competitive, or were in 
conflict with it.   
 
This task is extremely difficult because it requires that the judge and jury 
understand the long run optimization strategy of the firm.  Economists have a multitude 
of oligopoly models and cannot agree on which is best.  It may be almost impossible for 
the court to correctly and with high confidence make the calculations required by the 
Fisher rule.  In the Microsoft case, for example, both sides failed to adequately explain 
the long run profit maximization model that Microsoft actually used to price Windows 
over a long period of time, before as well as after the alleged anti-competitive actions.  
One wonders how the courts would possibly be able to make the additional hypothetical 
calculations required for the implementation of the Fisher rule.  What oligopoly model 
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would the court adopt?  What other strategies would the court expect to have been 
implemented in the absence of the act that may be characterized as anti-competitive?  
What equilibrium paths would the court expect to be followed in the long run?  These are 
very hard questions that are unlikely to be answered in a satisfactory way given our 
present knowledge of economics.  In practice, the Fisher rule would constrain dominant 
firms from aggressive pricing, investment, and innovation behavior that would be seen, at 
least by some economists, as fitting exactly the requirements of anti-competitive behavior 
of the Fisher rule.  If such aggressive behavior is prevented or punished, the ultimate 
losers are current and future consumers. 
 
Moreover, the additional caveat of the new Fisher rule means that the present 
versus hypothetical analysis described above has to be done with reference to monopoly 
rents over and above those that arise out of “superior skill, foresight, and industry.”  So, 
two types of monopoly rents have to be calculated in each case of the hypothetical 
equilibrium (where the action is not taken but possibly other hypothetical actions are 
taken) and of the actual equilibrium (where the action was taken).  The judge and jury 
now have the additional burden to ascertain the extent that present as well as hypothetical 
rents are monopoly rents not arising out of “superior skill, foresight, and industry.”  This 
makes their task even more difficult. 
 
Based on these considerations, the Areeda predation rule is vastly superior 
because it does not require the court to make the very difficult profit maximization 
calculations described above, some of which are by their nature speculative because they 
require an analysis of firm behavior in hypothetical situations.  Instead, the Areeda rule is 
based on a comparison of incremental cost and price, which are much easier to determine 
than what is required in the Fisher rule.   
 
There is a second important deficiency of the new Fisher rule that also applies to 
the old one, and I have mentioned it in my original article: the rule may mischaracterize 
pro-competitive behavior as predatory and anti-competitive.  Although some anti-
competitive actions have the features described by the Fisher rules, so do many pro-
competitive actions.  That is, every action that obeys the Fisher rule is not anti-
competitive.  There are many pro-competitive actions that firms take where they sacrifice 
profits for some time in order to gain profits in the long run.  For example, suppose that, 
in an industry with network effects, a firm sells a product at a low price (but above 
incremental as well as break-even average cost), expecting to attract customers to its 
product of proprietary design.  Moreover, suppose that as new customers come to market, 
the firm continues to use this strategy and does not increase the price over an extended 
period of time.  As a consequence, the firm’s market share increases to the point that this 
firm is considered dominant.  This strategy may have purely pro-competitive causes but it 
fits well in the Fisher definition of anti-competitive acts.  A court implementing the 
Fisher rule could find such a firm liable of predation and thus eliminate the benefits to 
consumers of the pro-competitive strategy. 
 
Finally, the Fisher rule does not require that the lost monopoly rents be eventually 
recovered.  The courts are urged to characterize acts that fit the Fisher rule as predatory 
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and to take action against firms exhibiting such behavior typically before the final act of 
recovery of profits occurs, and therefore without knowledge or certainty that profit 
recovery will occur.  Thus, the Fisher rule does not wait for the final act (recovery of lost 
rents) that could distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive acts.  It rushes 
to judgment before a certainty of an anti-competitive act.  Prof. Fisher is concerned that 
unless antitrust authorities act before consumers are harmed, “corrective action might 
come too late.”  But, if we follow Prof. Fisher’s rule, we can rely only on faith in the 
correctness and applicability of an oligopoly model to reach the conclusion that 
consumers will be harmed at some time in the future.  There will be no certainty.  And, in 
most hypothetical situations, given the multitude of oligopoly models with contradictory 
results, there cannot even be a consensus of a high probability that consumers will be hurt 
in the future.  Thus, the Fisher rule will just create one more battle ground among 
economic consultants, some stating that it is inevitable that consumers will be hurt in the 
future, while others seeing only pro-competitive behavior.  Ultimately, if this rule is 
adopted, the big winners will be economic consultants.  The big losers will be companies 
that take aggressive competitive actions, which will regularly be sued on predatory 
grounds by their less aggressive (or less efficient) rivals.  In the long run, if the rule is 
widely adopted, repeated antitrust intervention will coach aggressive competitors not be 
that aggressive and to instead accommodate competitors, resulting in very significant 
losses to consumers. 
 
 
3. Issues Raised by Dr. O’Brien 
 
In his comment, Daniel O’Brien concentrates on four issues discussed in my 
paper.  These are (i) the effects of the per processor contract in the earlier Microsoft case; 
(ii) Windows pricing; (iii) the issue of substitutability of an Internet browser with 
Windows; and (iv) the costs and benefits of the proposed break-up.  I respond to each 
issue in sequence.  O’Brien sees Microsoft “per processor” licensing practices before the 
1995 consent decree as a weak form of exclusive dealing arrangement on top of a non-
linear pricing contract.  Whether it is possible to see these contracts in this light would 
require a full analysis of the market equilibrium, which, although very interesting, cannot 
be done here.  However, in general, there is no definite conclusion on the welfare 
implications of non-linear contracts offered to oligopolists, and this short rejoinder is not 
the appropriate place for a full analysis of this issue.  Moreover, in my original article, the 
pre-processor issue is only discussed in passing as part of a historical introduction to 
previous antitrust cases against Microsoft, while my article focuses on the current U.S. v. 
Microsoft case.   
 
On the issue of Windows pricing, O’Brien concludes: “it is at least plausible that 
the Windows price is close to the ‘monopoly’ price.”  He bases this conclusion on a 
recent paper by Werden (2001) who assumes that Microsoft sells Windows to two 
different demand functions (one for expensive, and one for cheap computer hardware) 
and is constrained to sell at the same price to manufacturers on both demand curves.  
Essentially Werden argues that demand heterogeneity (cheap versus expensive hardware) 
and the fact that computers are vertically differentiated and are sold at a variety of prices 
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could account for a low elasticity of the derived demand for Windows, and this is “likely 
to reduce substantially the monopoly price of Windows.”5  Opposite claims are made by 
Reddy et al. (2001). 
 
In my opinion, there are three problems with the Werden paper.  First, Werden 
(and Reddy et al.) does not seem to take into account the influence of the Windows price 
on the demand for the final product (computer hardware plus Windows) as is appropriate.  
Thus, in Werden the problem is formulated as if the derived elasticity of demand for 
Windows does not depend on the Windows price but rather only on the computer 
hardware price.  This does not disqualify the methodology of his argument, but does 
require an adjustment of his calculations, which affects the monopoly price calculation.6  
Moreover, even when the individual demand functions for Windows are (weakly or 
strictly) concave in their respective ranges, the aggregate (market) demand function 
defined for a wide range of prices may not be concave.  Therefore the profit 
maximization problem may not be quasi-concave in price, and there is no guarantee of a 
single peak of the profit function in the price of Windows.  Thus, it is very possible that 
sometimes the price calculated from the first order conditions does not correspond to the 
global profit maximum.7  Second, for the monopoly price determined by Werden to even 
come close to the actual Windows price, he has to assume very low prices for hardware, 
which are hard to justify in the relevant time period.  Third, many of the calculations are 
done without pinning down the shares of cheap and expensive computers, which is 
                                                 
5 Werden also allows Microsoft to realize some revenue from complementary goods to Windows 
that it also sells.  Although this in effect lowers the monopoly Windows price as in Economides (2001), it is 
not the main issue he raises. 
 
6  Taking into account the influence of the Windows price on the demand for the final product, I put 
the Werden model in the framework of Economides (2001).  Suppose there are two demand functions for 
computers, D1(pH1 + pW)  and  D2(pH2 + pW), where prices  pH1  and  pH2  are the prices of expensive and 
cheap computer hardware and  pW  is the price of Windows.  Total demand for computers is  D = D1(pH1 + 
pW) + D2(pH2 + pW).  Let the market share of the expensive computers be  s1 = D1/D  so that  D2/D = 1 - s1, 
and the demand elasticities be |ε1| and |ε2|.  Microsoft’s profits from Windows sales are  
 
ΠW = pW [D1(pH1 + pW) + D2(pH2 + pW)] - FW , 
 
where  FW  is the fixed cost.  Profit maximization requires 
 
D + pW[dD1/dpW + dD2/dpW] = 0  ⇔  1- pW[s1|ε1|/(pH1 + pW) + (1 - s1)|ε2|/(pH1 + pW)] = 0. 
 
Given the two elasticities, the two prices of computer hardware (cheap and expensive models), and the 
share of the expensive models sales, this quadratic equation determines the optimal candidate monopoly 
price for Windows as a function of the two demand elasticities and the two hardware prices.  Since, in 
general, the profit function is not quasi-concave, one needs to test which of the first order condition 
solutions is the global profit maximum.  Then one needs to plug in the actual share of expensive computers  
s1, the two demand elasticities and the two hardware prices, and reach the optimal Windows price.  Werden 
(2001) and Reddy et al. (2001) working with a less accurate model as explained above, differ in their final 
conclusions on the profit maximizing value of  pW. 
 
7  Reddy et al. (2001) point to an example in this problem where the first order condition solution 
corresponds to a local minimum of the monopolist’s profit function. 
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necessary since we know the average price of hardware in the relevant time period.  As a 
more general matter, it would seem that Microsoft, being in complete control of the OEM 
channel as argued in trial, should have been able to charge different prices for high end 
and low end computers, or at least adjust the individualized contracts it offered to OEMs 
based on their mix of cheap and expensive computers.  If one assumes two different 
(derived) demand curves for Windows, one has to also explain why Microsoft is 
constrained to a single price.8 
   
On the substitutability of browsers with Windows I have little additional to say.  
On the breakup remedy, O’Brien and I do not disagree. 
 
 
4. Issues Raised by Professor O’Toole 
 
On the issue of the breakup, O’Toole suggests to consider the degree of 
incompatibility as a policy variable.  I have no objection, and I have done so in a number 
of papers dating as far back as 1987.  Many economic models show that full 
compatibility is preferable for society than incompatibility.  But antitrust authorities and 
courts do not have the ability to impose compatibility.  Compatibility could be imposed 
by a regulatory body, but this requires regulation and all the problems that regulation 
brings. 
 
The issue of barriers to entry raised by O’Toole is important for this case and for 
antitrust in general because it can be misunderstood, and often it has been.  There is an 
increasing number of goods that are produced with processes that exhibit increasing 
returns to scale, that is, their average production cost decreases with quantity.  There are 
also an increasing number of goods that exhibit positive consumption externalities or 
“network effects,” so that the value of the last unit is increasing in the number of units 
sold (or expected to be sold).  In both of these cases, the existence of increasing returns to 
scale or of network effects does not by itself create barriers to entry, as long as the 
technology of production is available to competitors.  In contrast, as I have noted in the 
original article, barriers to entry exist when, in the relevant time frame, entrants are 
facing asymmetrically higher costs than the incumbent(s).  This fact was lost to the court, 
which did not define the relevant time frame for the analysis.  Instead, the court took a 
snapshot, and characterized existence of many Windows-compatible applications as 
immediate evidence of barriers to entry.   
 
 On the issue of a possible consent decree that would settle the case, O’ Toole 
believes that DOJ should be risk averse in constructing a consent decree since previous 
experience has shown significant levels of information asymmetry between Microsoft 
and DOJ.  I believe that, in constructing a consent decree or in proposing remedies, DOJ 
should take into consideration the informational asymmetry between Microsoft and itself, 
                                                 
8  Werden states that price discrimination based on PC type is impractical.  But, if there are two 
substantially different monopoly prices for low end and high end PCs, Microsoft is likely to have found a 
way to extract the extra surplus from the OEMs either through contractual arrangements or through its 
control of the technical standards. 
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as it always does.  Such an informational asymmetry is typical of any settlement or 
remedies proposal involving a high technology firm, and may also arise often in low 
technology cases.  Does the informational asymmetry mean that a breakup is preferable?  
No!  And, with full knowledge of the costs of a breakup to consumers and firms, DOJ has 
historically refrained from proposing such a draconian measure except in a tiny 
percentage of cases.  Instead, in a large number of cases where it was at an informational 
disadvantage, DOJ has constructed detailed conduct remedies proposals and settlements 
that eliminate anti-competitive behavior without resorting to a costly breakup.  I believe 
that conduct remedies should have also been the appropriate proposal by DOJ in this 
case, and DOJ must have also shared this belief when it proposed a conduct-based 
settlement to Microsoft in March 2000. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Ultimately, the antitrust case against Microsoft is relatively weak.  After review 
by the Appeals Court and possibly by the Supreme Court, it is extremely unlikely that the 
final outcome will be a breakup of Microsoft.  In fact, the final remedy imposed on 
Microsoft or the terms of a possible settlement of the DOJ suit are very likely to be 
weaker than DOJ’s settlement terms of March 30, 2000, to which Microsoft is reported to 
have agreed.9 
 
The Microsoft case has certainly been the most important antitrust case of the 
“new economy” this far.  Unfortunately, its legal battle was fought to a very large extent 
without the use of the economics tools that are at the foundation of the new economy and 
were key to the business success of Microsoft.   There are a number of reasons for this.  
First, often, legal cases are created and filed before an economist is found who will create 
the appropriate economic model to support the case.  Second, the economic theory of 
networks is so inadequate and unsettled that there is no commonly accepted body of 
knowledge on market structure with network externalities, based on which one could 
evaluate deviations toward anti-competitive behavior.  Third, the legal system has 
tremendous inertia to new ideas and models.  Fourth, the legal system is ill-equipped to 
deal with complex technical matters.  Fifth, given all these facts, lawyers on both sides 
find it easier to fight the issues on well-treaded ground even if the problems are really of 
a different nature.  It is as if there is a dispute among two parties in the middle of a 
heavily forested area, but the lawyers of both parties fight it as if the dispute happened on 
the open plains, because they know the way disputes on the plains are resolved while the 
law of dispute resolution in forests has yet to be established.  I hope that in the last parts 
of the legal process of this case, as well as in the next new economy antitrust case, there 
will be a deeper understanding of the economics of networks and of the way the law 
should apply to network industries. 
 
                                                 
9  Provided of course that published reports of the settlement proposal in the New York Times and 




Economides, Nicholas (2001), “The Microsoft Antitrust Case,” (2001), Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy, this issue. 
 
Fisher, Franklin M. (2001), “Innovative Industries and Antitrust: Implications of the 
Microsoft Case,” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to 
Policy, this issue. 
 
O’Brien, Daniel P. (2001), “Comment on ‘The Microsoft Antitrust Case’,” Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy, this issue. 
 
O’Toole, Francis (2001), “The Microsoft Competition Policy Case,” Journal of Industry, 
Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy, this issue. 
 
Reddy, Bernard, David Evans, Albert Nichols, and Richard Schmalensee (2001) “A 
Monopolist Would Still Charge More for Windows:  A Comment on Werden,” 
forthcoming in Review of Industrial Organization.  
 
Reddy, Bernard, David Evans, Albert Nichols, and Richard Schmalensee (2001) “A 
Monopolist Would Still Charge More for Windows: A Comment on Werden’s 
Reply,” forthcoming in Review of Industrial Organization. 
 
United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit (2001), transcript 
of oral argument in United States v. Microsoft, case no. 00.5213, February 26-27, 
2001. 
 
Werden, Gregory J. (2001), “Microsoft’s Pricing of Windows and the Economics of 
Derived Demand Monopoly,” forthcoming in Review of Industrial Organization.  
 
Werden, Gregory J. (2001), “Reply to Reddy et al.”  forthcoming in Review of Industrial 
Organization. 
